The Future of Basque Nationalism in Iparralde by JACOB, James E.
69Rev. int. estud. vascos. 44, 1, 1999, 69-88
Frantzia aldeko egungo euskal abertzaletasunaren izaera aztertzen du artikulu honek eta, bestalde, etorkizunean
haren baitan eragina izan dezaketen faktore nagusiak seinalatzen ditu: Espainia aldeko euskal mugimenduaren eragin
ideologikoak, frantses gobernuaren mesfidantza euskal mugimenduarekin negoziatzeko orduan eta Iparraldeko
mugimendu abertzaleak —premiarik gabeko barne gatazkek ahuldurik— elkar hartzeko burutu beharko dituen
eginahalak.
Giltz-Hitzak: Euskal abertzaletasuna Frantzian. Frantses gobernuaren politika. Oinarrizko gaiak Frantziako euskal
abertzaletasunari buruz. Euskara eta euskal kultrua. Indarkera. Moderazio eta batasun politikoak.
Este artículo examina la naturaleza del nacionalismo vasco contemporáneo en Francia e identifica los principales
factores que pueden ejercer influencia sobre su futura evolución: las influencias ideológicas del movimiento vasco
español, la reticencia del gobierno francés a la hora de negociar con el movimiento vasco y los esfuerzos del
movimiento vasco-francés por unirse en una causa común y superar la tradición de conflictos internos que
innecesariamente ha debilitado el bando nacionalista vasco en Francia.
Palabras Clave: Nacionalismo vasco en Francia. Política del gobierno francés. Cuestiones básicas sobre el
nacionalismo vasco en Francia. Lengua y cultura vascas. Violencia. Moderación y unidad políticas.
Dans cet article on étudie la nature du nationalisme basque contemporain en France et on identitifie les
principaux facteurs qui peuvent exercer une influence sur son évolution future: les influences idéologiques du
mouvement basque espagnol, la réticence du gouvernement français au moment de négocier avec le mouvement
basque et les efforts du mouvement basco-français pour s’unir en une cause commune et surmonter la tradition de
conflits internes qui a affaibli inutilement le parti nationaliste basque en France.
Mots Clés: Nationalisme basque en France. Politique du gouvernement français. Questions de base sur le
nationalisme basque en France. Langue et culture basques. Violence. Modération et unité politiques.
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“All things change… There is nothing in the world which is permanent. 
Everything flows onward; all things are brought into being with a changing nature;
the ages themselves glide by in constant movement.”
Ovid, circa 8 a.d1.
“Lehen hala, Orai hola
Gero ez jakin nola.”
“Once it was like that. Now it is like this.
In the future, who’s to know.”
Basque Proverb
One of the greatest uncertainties confronting the Basque people on the eve of the new
millennium is the future content of Basque nationalism as a political idea. Will the new
millennium provide a place for minority group politics within the accelerating logic of a united
Europe? Will the Basques be able to reverse now longstanding forces of socioeconomic and
cultural assimilation that threaten their survival on this eve of the new century?
Questions like these pose a fundamental challenge to the idea of Basque nationalism by
asking “what, “why,” and “how?” What is the purpose of Basque nationalism today, and what
kind of appeal can it make for popular support? Can extra-legal movements transcend the
dialectic of violence and integrate themselves back into the legitimate mainstream of Basque
political and cultural life? Will a unitary state like France be willing to implement policies to
insure the survival of Basque language on its territory? These questions pose fundamental
challenges for the Basque movement, and together they raise the question of the trajectory of
Basque nationalism in the new millennium. My purpose in this article is to discuss the future
of Basque nationalism in France. I intend to extend the historical analysis of Basque
nationalism in France that I made in the Hills of Conflict2, and to suggest some of the
elements that will affect the future of Basque nationalism in France based on the trajectory of
contemporary events. 
The rise of a nationalist movement needs to be understood as a reaction to its
environment. As the Basque bibliographer Jon Bilbao once put it, “nationalism is the sign of a
people who are unwilling to die.” In the course of the past century, the trajectory of French
Basque politics has differed from that of Spanish Basques because of the differing historical
and institutional circumstances in which each took root. The evolution of Basque nationalism
in France is an artifact of Basque culture and institutions. It is also a story about France. The
political evolution of the French Basques needs to understood in light of several overlapping
layers of context to explain the content of Basque political mobilization in France today. For
the French Basques those influences range from the micro to the macro. Basque identity and
political mobilization in France are a product of the combination of several of these
contextual factors. Among them are: the internal socioeconomic, political and demographic
dynamics of the Pays Basque in the late twentieth century; the external influence of the
Spanish Basques and their impact on their ethnic kin in France; the critically important
context of a French political culture that has historically refused to recognize minority
demands; and, finally, the impact of broader trends in Europe ranging from the emerging
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1. Pythagoras in Metamorphoses, Book 15.
2. James E. Jacob, Hills of Conflict; Basque Nationalism in France; Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1994,
politics of the European Union to the resurgence of nationalism and self-determination in the
aftermath of the fall of communism. Taken together, they define the historical evolution of
Basque militancy in France and provide the framework for understanding the future trajectory
of Basque nationalism. 
THE STATE OF BASQUE NATIONALISM IN FRANCE IN THIS FIN DE SIECLE
The study of Basque politics demonstrates that the coming of the millennium is, at best,
an artificial watershed in the history of the Basque people. Viewed from this fin de siecle, it
clear that many of the most important trends at work in the Pays Basque, and in the
nationalist camp, have their origins stretching back to the 1960’s if not before. The primary
goals of Basque political mobilization in France have been moderated over time but remain
largely unrealized in the unitary French State. Abertzale (“Basque Patriot”) calls for
independence from France in the 1960’s have given way to more realistic calls today for the
creation of a separate Basque department within a sovereign and intact France. Despite the
prominence given to the sanctity of the integrity of its territory in the history of French ideas,
even the Basques’ willingness to accept a greater autonomy within a sovereign France has
been rebuffed. While the creation of new departments has occurred, including in Corsica, the
government continues to fear that any political or administrative accommodation will be a
way station on the road to separatism and independence. This has been true for even
cultural and linguistic claims. Despite an unbroken chain of devoted militancy, cultural
groups have been largely unable to significantly extend state support of the Basque
language school system, or Ikastolas, over the past thirty years. From the time of the
Revolution onward, France has been unwilling to encourage the preservation of France’s
minority languages, preferring instead to watch as broader historical trends lead to their
inevitable assimilation. 
In the case of the Basques, however, government policy has developed in response to
its fear of separatism and the rise of indigenous Basque political violence in France.
Separatist violence, whether in Corsica, Brittany or the Pays Basque strikes directly at the
core of Jacobin values. The integrity of French territory has been central to the French civic
religion since the Revolution, and made of Basque nationalism an adversary in a game
without compromise. From the standpoint of the state, since indigenous Basque violence first
appeared in France by those close to the Ikastola movement, it has refused on principle to
make concessions even on the mildest educational or cultural issues for fear of legitimizing
the abertzale camp and creating a slippery slope of increasing Basque political demands. 
The rise of political violence among French Basques is the most controversial aspect of
abertzale militancy in France over the last quarter century. It has led to the fragmentation of
the abertzale movement, and discredited the nationalist cause in the eyes of the electorate
and the state. Today, many militants understand that the use of violence (and the threat of
separatism) has led the preservation of the Basque language to become a hostage between
the French government and the radical fringe of the abertzale camp in France.
There is no Y2k problem that would mark a new and distinct threshold for Basque
nationalism with the turn of the millennium. Rather, as we approach the new century, it is
clear that the agenda of Basque political mobilization in France has been influenced since
the 1960’s by the policies and actions of successive French governments across the political
spectrum. Evidence suggests that whether controlled from the right or left of the French
political spectrum, the State reflects an ongoing Jacobin ideal that opposes the linguistic and
political rights of indigenous minority groups as a doctrine of faith.
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What is important about the coming of the millennium, however, is its importance as a
symbolic threshold separating the past and the future. In that way, the new millennium
represents a kind of unfolding tabula rasa onto which the collective hopes and dreams of a
people can be cast. In the thousand years since the coming of the first millennium, the
popular image of the coming of the millennium has carried with it the notion of epochal
change and apocalyptic justice. It holds the promise of legitimating the best of contemporary
circumstances while offering the possibility of redemption and change. For peoples
threatened with assimilation and the dilution of their language and culture, the millennium
also offers its legitimating imprimatur for those cultures that can demonstrate the ability to
culturally and linguistically adapt to the demands of the future, and survive as distinct
language groups. It is clear that for it to survive, Basque culture must be of the future and not
simply a museum of a cherished cultural past. As it faces the future, one dimension of the
adaptation of Basque culture will be determined, in part, on www.euskadi.com.
THE CORE QUESTIONS OF BASQUE NATIONALISM
Viewed from this fin de siecle, the abertzale camp in France is not alone in viewing the
coming millennium with a mixture of hope and concern. At the same time, contemporary
abertzale militants are still asking many of the same questions that have been asked by
successive generations of Basque nationalists in France stretching back to Chanoine Pierre
Lafitte’s Aintzina in the 1930’s.
One of the most important of those questions concerns the “why” and “what” of Basque
nationalism–the motives behind the rise of identity-based politics and its goals. Equally
important for each generation of militants in the twentieth century has been the preoccupying
“how” or the means to attract wider support among the Basque-speaking population. The
challenge of Basque politics in the last third of the century is that at each ideological
crossroads, the abertzale movement was often more willing to opt for ‘ideological purity’ and
a harder line than for more modest and less threatening goals destined to win more public
support. While the faces change, as do their ideological labels, many of these questions and
answers continue to define an ongoing dialogue within the abertzale camp in France. Often,
as we will see below, this internal debate has led to preoccupying internal conflicts and
internecine struggle when the Basque cause could afford it least. These debates have
served, however, to define the content of Basque militancy in France.
THE QUESTION OF BASQUE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
One of the greatest cultural and demographic contrasts between the Basque provinces
of France and Spain is reflected in the rural, agrarian nature of the Pays Basque francais in
contrast to the far more urban context of the Basque Country in Spain. In this traditionally
rural linguistic space, the total number of Basque speakers in France has been variously
estimated at approximately seventy thousand people, or about ten percent of the Basque
speaking population of Spain. Today, the virtual totality of French Basques are bilingual in
French. Demographically, those who speak Basque as a mother tongue are growing older,
while French is increasingly the first language of Basque youth. These trends demonstrated a
longer struggle against cultural assimilation that stretched back at least to the French Third
Republic. By the end of World War One, it was clear that the process of francophone
assimilation was fully engaged in the agricultural interior of the Pays Basque. At the same
time, the cradle of Basque language use in France, the rural interior continued a process of
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depopulation that had first begun, in some cases, in the mid-nineteenth century. The
common motivation of many heirs and non-heirs alike after World War Two has been to leave
the land and seek a better quality of life in occupations in the cities of the Basque coast or
beyond. As a result, the best that might be hoped for was that the children of these Basque
emigrants might be bilingual, at best. It was for this reason that groups like IKAS, Seaska and
its Ikastolas, Gau Eskoka and Ikastaldi, among others, were created–to seek to reverse these
linguistic trends, especially among children in kindergarten and primary school. The greatest
obstacle these groups have had has been the indifference of the French State and its
unwillingness to adequately fund the Ikastolas as Basque language “charter schools.” One of
the earliest platforms of Enbata and succeeding movements in France has been the defense
of Basque language and culture threatened today as never before.
One of the greatest indicators of the process of assimilation at work in the Basque
country has been the decline of Basque language use in France. These declines have been
greatest among Basque youth aged sixteen to twenty-five3. Twenty-five years ago, fully forty-
seven percent of Basques of this age spoke Basque. Today, that number has fallen to only
seventeen percent. More important for the future, only six percent of Basque children under
the age of sixteen speak Basque as their mother tongue. As Erramon Bachoc, President of
the Institut Culturel and a sociolinguist by training, put it, “the use of the Basque language by
Basque families and children is now in virtual “free fall”. This comes despite forty years of
effort by Basque cultural groups to reverse what seem to be accelerating and nearly
inevitable tides of assimilation.
In 1996, the defense of the language was given further prominence when it figured
prominently in this “Schema d’Amenagement du Pays Basque”–a blueprint for the social and
economic revitalization of the Pays Basque. Three years later, however, the “Conseil de la
Langue Basque” called for in the “Schema” has yet to be created because of conflicts
between competing Basque cultural groups. 
If the French government has been largely unwilling to liberalize its policies regarding
minority language use in France, the growing authority of the European Union has offered
European minorities another forum in which to seek cultural and linguistic support. The
broader issue of human rights has been a visible concern of the foreign policy of the
European Union as well as of the European Parliament. Indeed, Turkey’s application for
admission to the E.U. had been placed on hold for a number of reasons, among them include
its handling of the Kurdish problem, as well as its record on the rights of prisoners and
journalists.
The issue of language policy is one dimension of human rights where the will of Europe
may force changes in French domestic policy. The European Union’s adoption of the long-
awaited “European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages” was at best a symbolic
gesture in support of Europe’s cultural richness. Yet it must have been satisfying to Basque
militants of the 1960’s, coming as it did some thirty-five years after Enbata had joined Breton
and Occitan groups and the Mouvement Federaliste Europeenne in calling for the creation of
a “Europe of Ethnic Groups.” 
The reality was the Charter was only symbolic in nature and did not have a mechanism
to force changes in national policy. This, of course, was the great fear of European
unification–its threat to the sovereign authority of existing states. While France formally
———————————
3. Enbata, no. 1571 (1 avril 1999), p. 5.
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signed the weakened and amended Charter, it did not formally ratify it4. Then, in July 1999,
France’s highest court ruled that the Charter constituted a threat to French unity and was in
violation of Article Two of the French Constitution, as recently amended, that stated that, “The
language of the Republic is French”5. If agricultural policy is any indication, It is clear that the
rise of the European Union will lead to further efforts to bypass Paris and other capitals in
making the case for minority languages and cultures in this larger political forum. For itself,
the French government is far more concerned with shoring up the use of the French
language, which is under assault by English as never before6. Both the United Nations and
the European Union have made clear their preferences for English over French in official
communications. But nowhere is this clearer than in language use on the Internet. In 1999,
English constituted the language of nearly 60% of Internet messages compared to only 4.3%
for French7. 
BASQUE POLITICAL CULTURE IN FRANCE
One of the greatest contextual obstacles facing the rise of a secular Basque nationalist
tradition in France has been the difficulty successive abertzale movements have faced in
gaining the support of the Basque public. One cause has been the long association between
Basque culture and language and the Catholic religion among this people that is one of the
most religiously devout in France. For much of French Basque history in the past two
centuries, it was the Basque clergy who served as a highly legitimate ethnic elite in the rural
and agricultural interior that was the cradle of Basque culture in France. “Eskualdun,
Fededun,” (“He who says Basque, says a believer”) captured a conservative Basque political
culture that viewed Enbata and more radical groups to come as fundamentally suspect. The
challenge facing Enbata in the 1960’s was to wrest control of Basque cultural symbols from
the hands of the clergy and their conservative allies, and to legitimate their own role as the
first secular nationalist movement the French Basques had ever seen. This was the critical
test for any new political movement–to gain public acceptance and legitimacy for itself as a
representative of the Basque people. This has continued to be a defining challenge for each
new Basque political movement in the last third of the century. Successive abertzale
movements or parties in France have had to confront the continuing presence of two
obstacles to Basque political mobilization–the indifference if not hostility of much of this
conservative Basque-speaking population coupled with the active institutional opposition of
France and its political class.
For both of these groups, the very idea of Basque independence has been the subject of
indifference if not derision or hostility. One example concerns Napoleon who, in 1804, greeted
Basque statesman Dominique-Joseph Garat, former Deputy to the Constituent Assembly in
1789, and later Senator, Count of the Empire, and trusted ambassador –and a vocal believer in
the idea that the Basques were descendants of the Phoenicians– by asking, “Well now,
———————————
4. “La France signe la Charte europeenne,” Enbata, no. 1576 (6 mai 1999), p. 3.
5. Jon Henley, “France makes sure French is nation’s only language,” The San Francisco Chronicle, July 4, 1999,
p. A22.
6. Le Figaro opposed the La Charte europeenne des langues because it threatened the French language at a
time when, “…it is being bastardized by Anglo-Saxon words.” Cited in “Bad news for Francophiles: United Nations,
European Union prefer English,” Nando News Online, January 22, 1999.
7. “Global Internet Statistics (by Language),” Source: www.euromktg.com, August 4, 1999.
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Monsieur Garat, how goes the ideology?”8. It was not, however, until the appearance of
Chanoine Pierre Lafitte’s clerical movement, Aintzina, in the 1930’s that the Church’s control
over Basque language and politics was even brought into question among this people who
were among the most faithful believers in France. Lafitte was a progressive clerical voice for
his time, but could and would not go beyond a cautious clerical regionalism for fear of
antagonizing the Church hierarchy. While Lafitte’s militancy would influence the consciousness
of two generations of French Basque militants, there were issues he was unwilling to address
publicly in the mid-1930’s. Thus, we see little in the pages of Aintzina about either Sabino
Arana Goiri and the rise of Basque Nationalism in Spain, or even about the Spanish Civil War
that was devastating the Spanish Basques twenty miles away. As modest as were the ideas of
Lafitte and his followers, they attracted the attention of the powerful deputy of the rural interior,
Jean Ybarnegaray, who stigmatized the young priest as being a “red” (read “communist”) fish
swimming in a baptismal font9. Ybarnegaray represented the values of the traditionally
dominant clerical and conservative French-Basque political culture in the first half of the
century. This political conservatism was passed to succeeding generations along with the
Basque language and culture. So, even today, the Basque movement measures the success
of its electoral strategy by hard fought percentage point gains in the Bascophone interior. 
Time did little to soften this reflexive opposition to the rise of new Basque political
voices. This explains the challenge that Enbata and succeeding movements have faced in
gaining popular support for their secular nationalism since the 1960’s. The gulf between the
perceptual universe of Basque farmers in the rural reaches of Basse-Navarre, Labourd or
Soule was a far reach from the milieu of the urban coast with its mixture of languages and
cultural assimilation where Basque nationalism first appeared in France. These rural Basque
families were the cradle of Basque culture in France, and viewed new ideas and even the
idea of change, itself, with understandable suspicion. One of the greatest challenges Enbata
faced was its difficulty in claiming to speak in the defense of Basque language and culture
when many of its early militants were not native speakers of the language. This proved to be
a gulf that separated these assimilated service-sector intellectuals from the reality of native
Basque-speakers in the agricultural interior. The majority viewed Enbata as a threat to a
familiar and structured way of life. Having emerged shortly after the first wave of ETA
refugees seeking asylum in France in the early 1960’s, Enbata was seen from the beginning
by the public as well as the government as carrying ETA’s ideological water and of providing
both public and private support for ETA and its militants. The impact of ETA, its own
ideological peregrinations, and its use of violence have been important influences on the
development of the French Basque movement from the founding of Enbata in 1963. 
One of the most important of ETA’s impacts on the French Basque movement was in
helping steer the ideological debate among French Basque militants following Enbata’s
abortive electoral defeats in 1967 and 1968, its prosecution by the French state, and its end
as a movement in 1974. Yet, first as a movement and then for the past twenty-five years as a
Basque nationalist weekly newspaper, Enbata has played a central role in the evolution of
Basque nationalist thought in France. Jacques Abeberry’s editorials in Enbata, and op-ed
pieces by Richard Irazusta, Jean-Louis Davant, Jean Haritschelar, and others, have reflected
the evolution of Basque political and cultural thought in France.
———————————
8. Cited in Eugène Goyheneche, Le Pays Basque, Pau: SNERD, 1979, p. 382.
9. The pun is based on the French term for goldfish “poisson rouge” that translates as red fish. See my Hills of
Conflict, chapter three.
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Following the defeat of its electoral strategy in 1967 and 1968, Enbata was wracked by
internal conflict over strategy and personalities. It fell victim, then, to the kind of internecine
warfare that the late abertzale historian, Eugen Goyheneche, called the tragic “tradition of
tribal struggle” within the Basque movement10. These interpersonal and political conflicts
within the abertzale camp served to focus the movement’s attention inward and prevented it
from extending its level of popular support within the Basque community. 
Understandably, in the desire to find a new ideological coherence and reason for being,
Enbata’s remaining members turned to ETA as a logical and convenient case for inspiration.
Ending its short hiatus after its electoral defeats in 1968, Enbata turned in its first new issue to
a long interview with an ETA spokesman who elaborated on the addition of Marxist goals to
traditional Basque nationalist goals of independence. The growing ties of Enbata to ETA were
the primary reason former Enbata leader Ximun Haran claimed he quit the movement. He
later went on to found and lead the French section of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). 
RADICALIZATION OF THE BASQUE MOVEMENT
Two broad political alternatives emerged out of Enbata’s demise in 1974 that continue to
influence Basque nationalist thought in France today. Both were part of ETA’s ideological
legacy, and reflected its impact on the political development of the French Basque
movement. The first of those alternatives mirrored the leftward move of ETA in the 1960’s, and
led in Spain as in France to the rise of the most leftist of abertzale movements in the north in
EHAS (Euskal Herriko Alderdi Sozialista (EHAS). EHAS differentiated itself from Enbata in the
purity of its Marxist analysis and its view of the primacy of the economic struggle over the
national one. EHAS also represented the first abertzale movement in the north to formally
unite with its counterpart in Spain, thus creating the first party that, nominally at least, was
present on both sides of the border.
What EHAS reflected was also a growing preoccupation with the ideological debates
taking place within the abertzale left in Spain. EHAS tried to accelerate the rise of Basque
political consciousness in France by grafting the ideological content of Spanish Basque
doctrines onto the French Basque condition. The problem was that the political context of
Basque life in Spain was not the same as in France, and the importation of Spanish Basque
ideologies out of whole cloth was as immediately suspect as it was ill-advised. Any analysis
of Enbata’s experience had to take account of the hostility it provoked from within traditional
Basque society and its elites. So it was difficult to explain how an even more avowed and
hard line Marxist party might succeed where Enbata, itself, had been unable to make
significant inroads among the conservative French Basque electorate. 
ON THE QUESTION OF VIOLENCE
The second political alternative that appeared in France and reflected ETA’s influence
was the appearance of indigenous violence carried out by French Basque militants in France
for the first time. The embrace of the ‘armed struggle’ represented a new and portentous
threshold in the political history of French Basques. Despite the fact that ETA had been using
violence as a political weapon against the Spanish state for much of the 1960’s, the first
———————————
10. See his comments in the publication of the French Basque affiliate of the Basque Nationalist Party, Ager, no.
166 (October 1, 1990), p. 5.
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incident of indigenous Basque political violence didn’t occur in France until 1973, and then
not again until the decade’s end. In 1973, a previously unheard of group calling itself
Iparretarrak (IK), or “Those of ETA of the North,” claimed responsibility for the first act of
political violence carried out by French Basques, an attack on a Pharmacy in the Basse-
Navarrese town of St. Etienne de Baigorry11. For the next twenty-five years, as its older
militants have been captured, new generations have been seduced by the Robin Hood
image of the armed struggle, and have attempted to use violence as a lever against the
French State and society. In subsequent attacks ranging over the next twenty five years,
Iparretarrak’s target list ranged from the symbolic to the real–from real estate speculators
profiting from the tourist economy of the rural interior to the presence of the French state and
its agencies in the Pays Basque.
The rise of Iparretarrak was important for a number of reasons. First, it represented the
first example of French Basque militants willing to engage in acts of violence as a tool of
Basque politics. Second, the young group’s very name reflected the impact of ETA’s tactical
and doctrinal writings on violence, and IK’s desire to carry out similar acts of violence in the
different circumstances of the French Pays Basque. It is interesting to note that ETA was
reported to be unhappy with IK’s violence, fearing that it would threaten the northern
sanctuary for ETA’s militants. Third, IK was the first French Basque movement whose early
militants came principally from the rural interior, especially Basse-Navarre. As such, it stood
in contrast to movements from Aintzina to Enbata and beyond whose militants came primarily
from the urban coastal cities. It was the nature of IK’s militants as “children of the village” that
enabled them to recruit among milieux that Enbata couldn’t penetrate. They could also speak
from firsthand knowledge about the problems of the rural agricultural economy,
depopulation, and real estate speculation.
Fourth, with its roots in the linguistic reality of the rural interior, and in contrast to its
predecessors, most of Iparretarrak’s militants spoke Basque as their mother tongue. This stood
in clear contrast to many of Enbata’s early militants whose first language was French. As a
result, according to other militants, the generation of militants of EMA and IK judged the worth
of a competing political idea in part on one’s ability to speak Basque. By raising the bar for
what constituted an abertzale, IK sought to win control over Basque linguistic and cultural
issues for itself. For the French government, the rise of Iparretarrak signaled ETA’s
contamination of even Basque educational and linguistic groups in France. Arising in part out of
groups in defense of the Basque language, IK confirmed the wisdom of French hardliners who
believed that any concessions at all to the abertzale camp would be unwise. The Jacobin fear
was that such concessions would engender a rising cycle of Basque demands that would lead,
at the extreme, to the territorial disintegration of France and the uniting of the seven Basque
provinces of France and Spain into an independent Euskadi. Because the government saw the
link between IK and educational groups like Seaska and the Ikastola movement, it was unwilling
to consider even modest educational or linguistic concessions despite their potential to
encourage Basque moderation as an alternative to isolate and undercut the radical camp. 
IK adopted as its organization structure the two-sided ETA and IRA model in which the
movement had a public as well as a clandestine face. IK’s early public face was the Herri
Taldeak movement that later gave way to Ezkerreko Mugimendu Abertzalea or EMA. In both
cases, the dividing line separating their militants from IK was very much unclear. French
authorities and even many other abertzale saw them as one and the same.
———————————
11. Ibid., ch. six.
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As it viewed the terrain of Basque political action in France, IK was correct early on in
believing that the Basque cause was weakened by the unnecessary duplication of
movements and their platforms. They were unwilling, however, to critically analyze the impact
of their violence on the abertzale cause. Their solution was to threaten to turn their violence
inward and to force other movements to join them or give way. In so doing, they sought to
eliminate any competition for primacy in the abertzale community in France12. As a result of
IK’s unmistakable threats to its leaders, EHAS disbanded. What IK’s threats represented was
a cycle of ideological “outbidding” that sought to hijack the political dialogue taking place in
the Pays Basque. What it served to do was to splinter the abertzale community over the
question of violence, and to further discredit the idea of Basque nationalism in France among
the public and the state. Beginning in the mid-1970’s, the Basque movement turned to
embrace either Marxism, or violence, or both, and this signaled the further radicalization of
the Basque nationalist camp. 
The rise of Iparretarrak has been the most controversial political issue in modern Basque
politics in France. In truth, its appearance has had two important and contradictory effects on
Basque political mobilization in France. First, it has undoubtedly served as a consciousness-
raising device among young Basques eager to find a vehicle for their evolving political
beliefs. At the same time, the Basque electorate as a whole is more sympathetic to the
Basque nationalist cause at century’s end than at any other time in their history. It does not
seem coincidental to note that the level of support for abertzale candidates has nearly tripled
in the twenty-five years since Iparretarrak first embraced the use of violence. Because many
of its militants came out of villages in the rural interior, Iparretarrak was able to focus on the
issues of importance to the rural community in ways that Enbata could not. Even among
those who disagreed with them, they were seen as “children of the village” and hence not
generally subject to public criticism. The greatest contribution of IK’s violence and political
beliefs was in its ability to mobilize a new generation of apolitical Basque youth, more given
to alternative music and fanzines than to the stuff of political struggle. IK represented a
growing belief across abertzale generations that the government was stonewalling legitimate
cultural demands and thus left the Basque movement no recourse by violence to try to
change public policy. 
While increasing the political consciousness of Basque youth, the rise of Iparretarrak
had other less positive consequences as well. For, at the same time, it served as another
example for the conservative Basque electorate as a whole, and to the French State, of the
fundamental radicalism of the idea of Basque nationalism in France. Thus, while the rise of
Basque violence served to mobilize young and more radical Basque youths, it also served to
further alienate others in the Basque electorate who had been unwilling to embrace much
tamer examples of Basque nationalist thought in the previous two generations. Yet, it should
be noted that IK’s violence coexisted with the slowly rising upward trend in votes for
abertzale candidates during the 1980’s, and this was especially noticeable in selected rural
cantons in Basse-Navarre. By 1988, that figure had risen to nine percent in the Pays Basque,
and approached twenty- percent in some cantons. While it would be wrong to claim the
strength of abertzale voting approached that in Spain, it is significant to note that the
abertzale vote has remained relatively stable over a decade at a level approaching ten
percent of the French Basque electorate. It is here that IK’s embrace of violence appears to
be an obstacle to the broader spread of abertzale consciousness. The key to increasing that
support is not to engage in a cycle of ethnic ‘outbidding’, but to demonstrate the ability of
———————————
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Basque candidates to speak to the bread and butter issues of greatest concern to Basque
voters including economic development in the interior and on the coast.
THE BASQUE TRADITION OF “TRIBAL STRUGGLE”
Looking back from this vantage point at the fin de siecle, the era of the 1970’s seems to
have left two legacies for the abertzale camp: ideological radicalism (including the armed
struggle) and internecine conflict. The irony is that each served to deprive the French Basque
movement of unity at a time when it needed it most. They stigmatized the abertzale cause
and held back its growth potential among the French Basque electorate. Even in times of
rural depopulation and economic decline when one would expect the greatest willingness to
embrace new political ideas, the Basque electorate continued to view the idea of Basque
nationalism with skepticism and uncertainty. One of the greatest doctrinal errors of the
Basque movement in the 1970’s was to answer marginal public support by espousing
doctrines that were even more radically Marxist, or violent, or both. 
Reflected in Goyheneche’s image of “tribal struggle” is the reality that each new
movement since the time of Enbata has sought to define itself not only in terms of its broader
goals, but also in contrast to their predecessors who had gone before. Many of the
broadsides launched within the abertzale movement seem evidently Freudian in nature–as
new groups sought to assert their own power by discrediting “the father” and rewriting their
history. In the spirit of the political aphorism that asserts that “all politics are local,” it was
clear that the abertzale community in France often wasted its time in mystifying internal
conflicts that detracted from their efforts to win wider public support. These conflicts were
based on an amalgam of issues, generally interwoven in changing combinations: end goals,
group politics, tactics (and the use of violence in particular), intergenerational conflict, as well
as ongoing interpersonal disputes. Enbata was more able to resist the temptation of fratricide
than were its successors due to the presence of founders like Michel Burucoa and Abbe
Pierre Larzabal who provided a direct link from Enbata to Abbe Lafitte’s Aintzina and his
cultural work in the 1950’s. Neither EHAS nor IK were similarly constrained, and rejected
outright the contributions of the groups that had preceded them.
By the mid-1980’s the presence of these two obstacles –internecine strife and the role of
violence in discrediting the Basque cause– characterized an abertzale camp in the process of
self-marginalization. The extent of the movement’s self-defeating fratricide was made apparent
at the Aberri Eguna at Hendaye in 1990 when radical Basque youth disrupted the celebration
by jeering at abertzale speakers of other generations and political camps. This seemed to the
ultimate fruit of the internal conflicts that had marked French Basque politics since Enbata’s
creation more than twenty-five years before. This disturbing scene demonstrated in stark
terms that without coming together in common cause, the Basque movement could not
present a credible platform to the Basque public or the State. Given the state’s reaction to
Iparretarrak’s violence, the rise of a moderate Basque center was seen as a necessary
alternative to the more radical camp if Basque politics were to remain credible in France.
THE RISE OF THE POLITICAL CENTER
The ascendancy of IK and the decline of EHAS left a void in the Basque political
spectrum in the early 1980’s and left many abertzale without a vehicle for their militancy. One
result led to the creation of sections of two Spanish Basque political parties in France, the
PNV and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). At the same time, diverse voices were calling for the
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creation of a moderate Basque political movement that would join diverse militants together
in common cause. This effort led to the creation of Euskal Batasuna (EB) by Enbata’s
Jacques Abeberry and others interested in building a moderate agenda for achievable
change. These voices of Basque moderation began to flesh out a number of goals that
represented a clear step away from much of the ideological cant that had preceded them.
Implicit in their effort was the creation of a Basque movement capable of uniting militants
across the ideological spectrum. However, it was clear from the outset that sharp and
irresolvable differences remained over the use of violence, and that it continued to constitute
a serious obstacle to political unification within the abertzale camp. The only way that this
unification had any chance to succeed was by deliberately leaving the issue of violence
aside as a matter of individual conscience. By excising the issue of violence from their
agenda, these militants were able to focus on a series of issues of broader interest like the
creation of a Basque department, and other goals within a broader agenda for change. The
result was the creation of Abertzaleen Batasuna (“Patriotic Unity”) uniting militants across
ideologies and generations. Among the parties joining in this umbrella grouping were Euskal
Batasuna (EB), Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), PNV, EMA and HA13. The irony of this new “catch
all” political movement was that EB had intended itself to be that unifying force only a few
years before. Since it is clear that partisan labels become personalized in the abertzale
camp, few militants were willing to join a rival’s party label for fear of loss of face. In this way,
Basque politics has often seemed to be a game of political musical chairs in which partisan
labels are created and shed in response to the needs of the moment.
The creation of AB thus provided a neutral meeting ground for militants from across the
political spectrum who shared the goal of advancing Basque interests writ large. The
willingness to set aside their differences and to speak with a stronger institutional voice was a
sign of the maturation of the Basque movement in France. As Richard Irazusta noted, the
collective decision to run a unified abertzale list in the 1988 elections was based on, “… a
strategic and mathematical analysis”14. By joining efforts, the abertzale camp was able to
more than double the abertzale vote between 1968 and 1988. This plateau was further
confirmed by the results of the elections of 1998 which recorded a pro-abertzale vote of
9.35% in the cantonal elections and 8.40% in the regionals. By 1988, it was clear that there
was a bedrock of abertzale electoral support approaching ten percent for the entirety of the
French Pays Basque, and greater still in select cantons in the interior. These electoral results
reflect the dissatisfaction of Basque voters with the policies of the traditional French left and
right, and their growing willingness to seek new solutions to their problems from a more
responsible abertzale camp. The electoral results confirmed the wisdom of Basque
moderates who recognized that successful politics is the art of the possible. 
THE PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE STATE
One of the most important factors affecting the future of Basque nationalism continues to
be the attitude of the French government toward the political and cultural grievances of its
regional minority groups. Viewed over the long term, French government policy toward its
indigenous minority groups has ranged between indifference and active repression in the two
centuries since the French Revolution. These temptations have been the polar stars of
———————————
13. “L’appel des formations politiques abertzale,” Enbata, no. 1576 (6 mai 1999), p. 5.
14. See his Tribune Libre column, “Batasuna Europan,” Enbata, no. 1571 (avril 1999), p. 8.
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administrations of both left and right in the Fifth Republic. In its Jacobin logic, the State has
been unwilling to legitimate ethnic demands by recognizing they reflect a “Basque” problem
or a “Corsican” one. In this way, former President Valery Giscard d’Estaing could claim that, “
Contrary to what one often says and writes, there is not a Corsican problem, there are
problems in Corsica.”15.
The predominant arena of government interaction with its regional minorities has passed
from the political arena into the “iron cage” of the bureaucracy. The unwillingness of the
French government bureaucracy to engage in meaningful dialogue even on educational and
linguistic issues seems to define the nature of a “passive aggressive” state and its policy.
The French Ministry of National Education has been the State’s most visible agent in cultural
matters. The pattern of its behavior has been repeated through much of the Fifth Republic:
delaying meeting with Basque cultural associations, and then engaging in endless and
inconclusive discussions that might one day result in token levels of financial support. 
There are two plausible explanations for the passive indifference or resistance of the
government to minority demands. First, they may well reflect a genuine uncertainty about the
appropriate political response to minority demands, given concern over the consequence of
any government action. One clear example was Mitterrand’s reversal of his electoral
promises to the Basques following his election as president in 1981. Using promises of a
Basque department in order to attempt to make inroads in the traditionally Gaullist Basque
electorate, Mitterrand then retreated from his promise once elected out of concern that it
provoke separatist demands threatening the French national interest. Yet, in other cases, the
French government has demonstrated its ability to act quickly when it was politically
expedient. This was the case in the decision to divide Corsica –already an administrative
region– into two departments as a spur for economic development. What underlay the
government’s decision was its calculation that by making political and administrative
concessions, it might undercut the several Corsican nationalist movements, and end the long
history of violence on the island. 
In the case of the Pays Basque, the government has been historically unwilling to make
similar changes because of the presence of ETA’s leadership structure in France, and the
ongoing fear of provoking a serious separatist sentiment there. It is clear that the constancy
of government policy toward the Basques demonstrates its commitment to a policy of “no
negotiation and no concessions.” The fact that the government occasionally grants meetings
to Basque cultural groups suggests a kind of passive-aggressive psychological warfare. The
government has demonstrated repeatedly through its deeds that it is curiously willing to
discredit the most moderate elements of the Basque movement who have acted openly and
in good faith in an attempt to safeguard their culture and language. In matters of national
education, the French State controls the agenda concerning the Ikastolas and the teaching of
Basque. As a result, Basque associations have few tools other than pleas of fairness and
decency in asking for government support. In truth, though, he greatest handicap Basque
cultural associations have had is the lack of more vocal support by either the Basque
electorate or elected officials that would give their appeals more force.
The French government’s minority policy is reminiscent of Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s
coinage of the term ‘benign neglect’ to describe government minority policy in the United
States in the 1960’s. Since the time of the French Third Republic, it has been clear that the
“syndrome of modernization” has posed an increasing threat of economic and cultural
———————————
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assimilation among France’s peripheral minority language groups. With the force of history
apparently on its side, the government could simply wait as the inexorable tides of
demographic change reduced the size and strength of minority populations16. If it could
claim credit for economic development strategies that happened to hasten that process, all
the better. One example is the recent announcement of the projected path of a new interstate
freight highway linking France with Spain and crossing the Pyrenees inland from the coast
through the heart of Basse-Navarre17. The two most likely proposed routes for the autoroute
are through either St. Etienne de Baigorry or scenic St. Jean Pied de Port. Many view the
building of this road as a calamity for Basque culture in France. The survival of the rural
beauty of Basse-Navarre will be traded for a handful of jobs in interstate gas stations and
discount motels. So goes the process of modernization. As Albert Dauzat explained it earlier
in the twentieth century: “Le francais rapporte. Le patois ne rapporte rien.” (French earns
money. Patois earns nothing).
While the primary focus of Basque approaches to the French government has involved
appeals to the French ministry of national education to support the Basque language Ikastola
charter school system, other political and economic issues have been ongoing as well. Many
of these issues have been assembled in a document, “Schema d’Amenagement du Pays
Basque,” first published in 1996. Among its elements were the call for the creation of a
Basque department, the creation of a comprehensive strategy for economic development of
the region, both urban and rural, and the creation of a “Conseil de la Langue Basque” to
enhance the preservation of Basque language and culture18. 
The demand for the creation of a separate Basque department is the most visible of
contemporary demands by the Basque moderate center, and one that has the longest
historical pedigree as well. This demand calls for the creation of a separate Basque
department from within the territory of the existing Department of the Pyrenees-Atlantiques,
itself a creation of the Revolutionary Assembly (as the Department of the Basses-Pyrenees)
with its prefecture in Pau. This is one of the oldest of Basque political goals in France, one
that surfaced for the first time during the Revolution, and again at the end of World War II,
before being picked up again by Enbata in the 1960’s. The creation of a separate
department is widely believed to be key to Basque political, economic and cultural needs,
even if it tacitly accepts the reality of French sovereignty over the Pays Basque.
The departmental administration of France falls within the purview of the French Ministry
of the Interior that is charged not only with the territorial administration of France but also the
maintenance of law and order. Despite Jacobin resistance, the creation of new departments
is not without historical precedents in France. In addition to the division of Corsica into two
departments mentioned above, the government sought to improve the administration of the
burgeoning Parisian region by creating a ring of new departments around the capital. In the
case of the Basques, however, it was clear that the contiguity of the Spanish Basque conflict,
and ETA’s presence in France, made the government consistently unwilling to entertain this
possibility. The problem for the government is that this idea has now entered the Basque
political mainstream and has achieved growing support not only by the Basque movement,
———————————
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17. “Ces projets autoroutiers qui balafrent la Basse-Navarre,” Enbata, no. 1579 (27 mai 1999), pp. 4-5.
18. “Gestation difficile du Conseil de la langue Basque,” Enbata, no. 1571 (1 avril 1999), pp. 4-5.
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but by economic development specialists as well as a growing number of Basque elected
officials and voters. 
By March, 1999, seventy municipal councils out of one hundred and fifty eight had voted
in favor of a Basque department compared to only eleven that had opposed it19. Even as
longstanding an opponent of a department (and the abertzale movement) as the longtime
deputy from the Basque interior, Michel Inchauspe, sponsored legislation in the French
National Assembly to permit the creation of new departments20. One of the greatest
arguments for the creation of a new administrative department for the Pays Basque
concerned its relative economic marginality compared to its more prosperous neighbors,
Bearn, in the Pyrenees-Atlantiques. In January, 1999, the regional newspaper, Sud Ouest,
published a list of the ten richest and the ten poorest communes in the Department of the
Pyrenees-Atlantiques. It revealed that all of the ten richest communes were in Bearn and that
all ten of the poorest communes were in the Pays Basque21. This has led to growing support
for the belief that only a separate Basque department can reverse the economic problems in
the region.
The question that remains open is whether this growing public support will be sufficient
to cause the government to reconsider its steadfast refusal to consider administrative
changes in the Pays Basque. It should be understood that French policy concerning the
integrity of French territory and culture –and its steadfast opposition to separatist
movements– lies at the very heart of the Jacobin civic religion, and has informed French
views on Basque nationalism since the Spanish Civil War. Regardless of the ideological
motivations, government reaction to Basque political demands has been virtually the same
from left to right under the Fifth Republic. What seemed like an attractive platform plank later
appeared altogether different in the election’s aftermath faced with the sobering challenge of
governing. In 1999, French Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement reported that Premier
Lionel Jospin had rejected the idea of a Basque department in, “…a clear and thus definitive
fashion”22. It is significant to note that Chevenement justified the government’s stand by
stating that the division of existing states along ethnic lines risked “Balkanizing” all of Europe.
Perhaps the height of the government’s defensive denial came in the aftermath of World
War One when Henri de Jouvenal, French delegate at Versailles, defined French reaction to
the minorities treaty being drafted as part of the dismantlement of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. According to de Jouvenal, France refused to vote on the minorities treaty at
Versailles, claiming that France, itself, had no minorities23. This is central to what Charles De
Gaulle once referred to as a “certain idea of France.” But it left the government in evident
denial, and reminiscent of the verse of Hughes Mearns who once wrote, “ As I was going up
the stair, I met a man who wasn’t there. He wasn’t there again today. I wish, I wish, he’d stay
away.”
What emerges from French government policy is scant meaningful support for the
teaching of the Basque language, and a focus on expanding the infrastructure of tourism
———————————
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23. Cited in the Minutes of the Sixth Committee (Political Questions) (Fourth Meeting), Records of the Sixth
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(gites ruraux, etc.) as the motor of the economy in the Pays Basque. In this way, we witness
the growing commodization of culture, in much the same way it has afflicted Indian
reservations in the United States. In France, ethnic cultural traditions are thus reduced to
performance art, and become faltering motors for seasonal regional economies.
THE IMPACT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ETA AND THE SPANISH
STATE
One of the greatest influences on Basque nationalism in France remains the uncertain
future of the Basque struggle in Spain. Few issues are more important today for abertzale on
either side of the border than is the “on again off again” nature of negotiations between ETA
and the Spanish government24. What we are witnessing in the Spanish Base case is an
example of two adversaries who are looking for a face-saving way out of a conflict that
neither can win. The result has been a history of “non-negotiations” involving Spanish officials
and former ETA leaders brought back from exile. Negotiated settlements are fragile
arrangements, and if successful involve a series of gestures by each side designed to signal
sincerity and good faith. Thus, in September 1998, ETA announced an “unlimited cease-fire”
in its conflict with Spain25. ETA’s announcement followed closely on an historic meeting with
twenty-three other nationalist groups that led to the ‘Lizarra Declaration” calling for
unconditional, multilateral cease talks and later the cessation of violence26. While it was first
dismissed as a trick27, it was also clear that neither side could afford to be blamed for a
missed opportunity. In November, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar announced that he had
approved talks with ETA28, but continued to insist that independence for the Basques was
“not negotiable”29. In its communique, ETA made mention of the Northern Irish peace talks,
and indeed much as been written about ETA’s interest in learning how the IRA succeeded in
bringing as avowed an enemy as the British government to the bargaining table30. At this
point, each side began a series of reciprocal gestures intended to move the peace process
along. In May, 1999, the process of political reconciliation extended to Basque partisan
politics in Spain with the creation of a Basque “Nationalist Front” that reflected ETA’s decision
to support the existing moderate government of the PNV and EA, an agreement quickly
labeled “dangerous” and “a catastrophe” by Madrid31. By summer, 1999, Spain had
released some ETA prisoners and transferred others to jails nearer the Basque provinces
fulfilling one of ETA’s longest-standing demands. While moving to close the newspaper Egin
———————————
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28. Johanna Tuckman (A.P.), “Spain Approves Talks With Militants,” Newsday, November 3, 1998.
29. “Spain rules out discussing Basque independence,” (A.P. wire story) Nandotimes, November 10, 1998.
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as part of ETA’s financial network32, in July, 1999, Aznar hailed the high court decision to
release twenty-three imprisoned Herri Batasuna leaders as a positive development in the
peace process33. As of August, 1999, Spain and ETA had only met once, in Switzerland in
May. At that time, ETA asked whether Spain would grant the Basques the right of self-
determination, and the government representatives stated they would never accept the
dismantlement of Spain or the right of the Basques alone to decide it34. Given the sensitivity
of these negotiations, it is unlikely more will occur before the next Spanish elections that will
take place in the spring of 2000.
France has clearly supported Spain in its struggle with ETA since the conclusion of
GAL’s campaign on French territory in the mid-1980’s. At that time, French policy regarding
asylum for ETA refugees changed in the face of violence carried out by GAL mercenaries
hired by the Spanish government. This marks fiften years in which French authorities have
worked closely with Spain in apprehending ETA fugitives, and the twentieth anniversary of
the French decision to no longer give “political refugee” status to Basques35. France has
used the timing of its arrests to send clear signals of its support for the Spanish government.
The day of Jose Maria Aznar’s swearing in as Spanish premier, France expelled one of ETA’s
former leaders, Josu Ternera, to Spain. Then, in March, 1999, French police arrested the
head of ETA’s military wing on the first day of Aznar’s official visit to Paris36. It is clear that
there is little the Basques can do to break this pact between Paris and Madrid. As a result,
the unfolding of the peace process offers the greatest hope for a peaceful solution to the
Basque struggle in Spain, and for an expansion of cultural and economic contacts between
Basques on both sides of the border. Peace between Spain and ETA will lessen the political
tensions surrounding Basque politics in France, and may well give the French government
the political cover it needs to engage in the kind of cultural reforms that it has heretofore
been reluctant to make. 
THE RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM IN EUROPE
One of the greatest spectacles in recent European history has been the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, Czechoslavakia, and Yugoslavia, the three greatest examples in Eastern
Europe of states without a strong and unified national identity37. The result has been the clear
resurgence of nationalism as a force in European politics. This has influenced the emergent
foreign policy of the European Union and been a worrisome development for governments
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like the French or Spanish that fear the precedent the international community has set in
recognizing the dismemberment of other European states. 
This was particularly true in 1991 when Germany essentially forced the European
Union’s hand in unilaterally recognizing the independence of Croatia and Slovenia from the
unraveling Yugoslavia. Faced with this fait accompli, France joined the rest of the E.U. in
reluctantly following Germany’s lead, but it was clear that France feared the consequences of
having opened this pandora’s box of national self-determination. Then French Foreign
Minister, Roland Dumas, voiced the fear that, “tomorrow what we have done for Yugoslavia
would be applied to other cases”38.
CONCLUSION
Such is the state of Basque nationalism on the eve of the new millennium. The coming of
the millennium is at best a symbolic threshold in the history of the French Basques. Many of
the issues extant in the Pays Basque today are the result of ongoing dialogues stretching
back to the early 1960’s, and, in the case of a Basque department, to the time of the French
Revolution. One of the common challenges of each Basque movement since Aintzina in the
1930’s has been the suspicion of the conservative and clerical Basque electorate whose
political culture has changed only gradually over the past half century. The suspicion of the
Basque public has combined with the indifference or hostility of the French state to
stigmatize the idea of Basque nationalism and even its most moderate goals. The
persistence of a Basque political consciousness in France has been a testimony to the
devotion of five diverse generations of militants who have nurtured it since the 1930’s39. For
the fidelity of these Basque patriots has been one of the sustaining strengths of Basque
identity in France. The transmission of abertzale political values across generations has
insured the birth and renewal of the idea of Basque nationalism in an inclement environment. 
Over the last thirty years the electoral support of abertzale candidates has more than
doubled. Though having reached a steady plateau of approximately nine percent, this figure
represents the cumulative effort of thirty years of trying to establish abertzalisme as a
legitimate political voice among the Basque people. If there is another factor that explains the
rise in support of abertalisme in the Pays Basque, it is surely the failure of the traditional
French political system to make good on its promises to the Basques. What successive
governments of right and left have done has been minimal if not illusory. Moments of clear
institutional hostility have been interspersed in recent times by a institutional indifference that
seems “passive aggressive” in its refusal to support even educational and cultural requests
emanating from Basque moderates. As we noted above, the French state nurtures in its
collective embodiment the victorious Jacobin ideology of the Revolution which has remained
the civic religion of the state. Since the time of the Third Republic, the state has encouraged
the syndrome of modernization, and been the agent of social and cultural assimilation in the
effort to create a unified French nation. This process of assimilation has come at the expense
of rural France, and of ethnic France in particular. Indeed, the issues facing the Basques are
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38. Cited in Alan Riding, “Separatists in Europe Indirectly Reinforce Unity in Yugoslavia,” The New York Times,
September 7, 1991, p. A4.
39. As an example of the delineation of those five generations of militants: (1) Chanoine Pierre Lafitte’s Aintzina;
2)Marc Legasse/Pierre Larzabal/Eugène Goyheneche (Aintzina, Hordago (Legasse)); 3) Abeberry/
Haran/Davant/Charitton, etc. (Enbata, Eusko Alkartasuna, E.B., etc. 4) Irazusta and his generation (EMA/IK); and 5)
Txetx, contemporary radical youth groups and Basque alternative music,etc.
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similar to those that have touched Brittany, Corsica or Occitanie. All have faced the
institutional willfulness of the French State, and the homogenizing logic of its public policy.
One of the greatest signs of encouragement in the evolution of abertzale activity in
France has been the ability of successive generations of militants to develop their beliefs and
frame them in response to the changing political context of France. Thus, Pierre Lafitte’s
clerical regionalism was as natural a reflection of its time as was the secular nationalism,
federalism and internal colonialist theses of Enbata in the 1960’s in the midst of France’s
crisis of decolonization. Later, the rise of the armed struggle and indigenous political
violence in France embodied the power of the idea of wars of national liberation that were
changing the history and cartography of the globe. As an abrupt shift in the course of
Basque nationalism in France, the rise of the armed struggle represented the choice of action
over reflection. It was part of the natural desire of younger militants who sought to write their
own histories, defining themselves as subjects, rather than as passive objects to be
manipulated by the hands of a distant state. Here, as in Spain, the rise of Basque violence
was a response that reflected the level of frustration engendered by the indifference or
hostility of the French and Spanish states. 
The rise of French Basque violence has proven to be a double-edged sword. At the
same time it has provoked a level of government repression heretofore unknown in the Pays
Basque, it has also been an undeniable factor in the rise to political awareness of a new
generation of Basque youth, steeped in the culture of alternative music and seeking a new
voice to give substance to their values and view of the future40. 
IK’s violence ultimately proved to be a way station on the way to Basque political
moderation. Indeed, one of the greatest legacies of IK’s violence was to provoke the most
profound reflection on the part of older militants whose own militancy had kept the abertzale
movement splintered (and hence weak). This was what Eugen Goyheneche called the
Basque movement’s tragic ‘tradition of tribal struggle.’ As a response, there emerged a new
commitment to political moderation that has largely defined abertzale politics in France in the
past two decades. The result of this political moderation is that the movement has focused on
unity rather than on fragmentation. In so doing, they have established themselves as a
legitimate and credible political voice among the Basque public. In contrast to the
ideological impasses of the past, this moderation reflects the maturation of Basque
nationalism in France. What has emerged from this latest chapter in abertzale action is a
rational understanding that even in Basque politics, politics is the art of the possible. This
appears to be one of the greatest fruits of contemporary Basque nationalism–in France as
well as in Spain. The rise of consolidation of Basque moderation means that the Basque
people will enter the new millennium looking to the future and not to the past. Yet, the coming
of the millennium also reminds us that history flows ever onward. As the Afghan proverb
notes, “The opportunity is dear and time is a sword.” For the Basques, as Lewis Carroll
suggested, “The time has come… to speak of many things”41.
Without concerted and united action to force government cooperation, there will come a
time in the next century when the Basque-speaking population of France will fall below the
level of sustainability. Every indication now points to the fact that this is the outcome the
French government seeks. If Basque culture is to be saved, it may well depend on two
———————————
40. See Stephane Davet, “Le chant d’amour de la jeunesse basque pour son identite culturelle,” Le Monde, 10
aout 1999.
41. From Lewis Carroll’s poem, “The Walrus and the Carpenter.”
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elements not under control of the French state: the future of minority policy in the European
Union, and the cultural and economic spillover of peace and prosperity in the more dynamic
Spanish Basque region. One great imponderable is the role of the European Union whose
commitment to human rights and minority rights may well force the hand of indifferent
national administrations. This may be reinforced by the growth of regional markets in the
European Union that may increase the ties between the Basque regions of France and Spain
as the significance of national borders erodes in the next century. The French Pays Basque is
far closer to the urban centers of San Sebastian and Bilbao than it is to its own regional
capital, Bordeaux, to the north. As the hope of a negotiated settlement with ETA has led to a
renewed process of political reconciliation among Basque political parties, it appears that the
Basque region of Spain can turn its attention away from violence and toward rebuilding what
was once an economy that was the envy of Spain. With the industrialized south as an engine,
there are clear economic and cultural benefits for the French Basques from closer
association with their ethnic kin in a united Europe. Europe may be the ferry to the future, but
Basques must navigate the shallows of policy and ideology that still guide the governments
of France and Spain. 
The key to the future of Basque culture is, in the final analysis, in the hands of the
Basque people, themselves. When reduced to its sociological essence, the survival of
Basque culture in the new millennium will reflect the aggregated individual judgements of
Basque youth and young married couples who now stand at a crossroads in their own
identities and in the history of the Basque people. The future of Basque culture will be
insured by the deliberate action of Basques today or it will slowly descend into folklore, a
nostalgic and marketable artifact of another time. If there is any legitimate future role for
Basque nationalism in the new millennium, it should be in creating a forward-looking agenda
of economic development and cultural preservation that will insure the survival of Basques
and Basque culture. If they fail, it is clear that one day in the not too distant future, it will be
said that the Pays Basque is no longer the home of the Basques, but of the descendants of
Basques.
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